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Defining the Environment in
Organism–Environment Systems
Amanda Corris*
Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, United States
Enactivism and ecological psychology converge on the relevance of the environment
in understanding perception and action. On both views, perceiving organisms are not
merely passive receivers of environmental stimuli, but rather form a dynamic relationship
with their environments in such a way that shapes how they interact with the world.
In this paper, I suggest that while enactivism and ecological psychology enjoy a
shared specification of the environment as the cognitive domain, on both accounts, the
structure of the environment, itself, is unspecified beyond that of contingent relations
with the species-typical sensorimotor capacities of perceiving organisms. This lack
of specification creates a considerable gap in theory regarding the organization of
organisms as coupled with their environments. I argue that this gap can be filled
by drawing from resources in developmental systems theory, namely, specifying the
environmental state-space as a developmental niche that shapes and is shaped by
individual organisms over developmental and, on a population scale, evolutionary time.
Defining the environment as an organism’s developmental niche makes it clearer how
and why certain contingencies have arisen, in turn, strengthening a joint appeal to both
enactivism and ecological psychology as theories asserting complementarity between
organisms and their environments.
Keywords: enactivism, ecological psychology, developmental systems theory, developmental niche,
naturalization of perception
INTRODUCTION
Enactivism and ecological psychology converge on the relevance of the environment in
understanding perception and action. On both views, perceiving organisms are not merely passive
receivers of environmental stimuli, but rather form a dynamic relationship with their environments
in such a way that shapes how they interact with the world. Much of the attention in the shared
literature between enactivism and ecological psychology has focused on the cognitive capacities
of a perceiving organism in relation to its environment; less attention has been given to the
environmental setting as a state-space, which is context-sensitive and organism-specific. As the
environment plays a defining role in the sort of interactions that are possible for perceivers,
specifying the structure of the environment for a species, or even a particular organism, can
shed light on the nature of perception. The aim of this paper is to draw out similarities between
enactivism and ecological psychology by specifying the structure of an organism’s particular
environmental setting in such a way that illustrates how that structure partly organizes the
organism–environment system and thus what features are perceptually relevant. A detailed account
of the environment on an enactivism–ecological psychology framework can, in turn, provide
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guidance for a naturalized theory of perception. I suggest that
viewing a perceiver’s environment as a developmental niche
specifies the environment in an organism–environment system
at the scale of the individual, thus providing a way of talking
about how individual variation in perceptual abilities and traits
can have an impact across developmental, behavioral, and
evolutionary timescales.
In ‘Enacting a World’ I detail the ways in which the
environment is discussed within the enactive literature.
‘Perceiving Environmental Information’ provides an overview
of the concepts used within ecological psychology to describe
the environment as guiding perception and action. In ‘Specifying
the Cognitive Domain’ I suggest that specifying an organism’s
cognitive domain as its developmental niche, as an integral
part of a larger developmental system, can serve as a way
of understanding organism–environment interaction as it is
discussed in both the enactive and the ecological psychology
literature. This conception of the environment, which draws on
resources from the developmental systems theory (DST) can be
built into a shared enactive-ecological psychology framework for
an appropriately naturalized account of perception.
ENACTING A WORLD
Enactive approaches to cognition share a commitment to a
principle of dynamic coupling between organisms and their
environments, with action being fundamentally guided by
perception. Though emergent varieties of enactivism may differ
in their philosophical aims (Ward et al., 2017), they each view
the organism–environment relation as central to understanding
the phenomenon of cognition. Additionally, they share a general
commitment to rejecting computationalist, representationalist
conceptions of cognition that posit it as a form of processing
via symbol manipulation. For enactivists, a suitable explanation
of cognition requires viewing it as a global process occurring
as a result of dynamic interaction across multiple scales of
organismal organization (with emphasis on the bodily scale, see
also Chemero, 2009 for similar views) and the environmental
state-space, rather than locally, as a matter of neural mechanisms.
On the conception of the enactive approach detailed in The
Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991, see also Thompson, 2004),
cognition emerges as a result of coupled interactions between
organisms as autonomous systems and their environmental
milieu. This relation is actualized through interactions
between the organism via its sensorimotor capacities and
the environmental features to which it is sensitive. Notably,
not all environmental features play a constitutive role in
an organism’s environmental milieu. The sensorimotor
structure of the organism constrains which features are
perceivable and thus actionable. Therefore, an organism’s
embodiment plays a central role in constituting cognition, as
“cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come
from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities”
(Varela et al., 1991, 173). Humans lack the capacity to perceive
ultraviolet light, and so ultraviolet light cannot modulate
action for human perceivers. Honeybees, which enjoy the
capacity to perceive ultraviolet light, regularly treat it as an
action-guiding visual cue.
While humans and honeybees both share the same physical
world, their perceived worlds drastically differ due to their
variation in sensorimotor capacities. Thus, an organism enacts
a perceived world depending on its sensorimotor capacities. As
Varela et al. (1991) stress, “perception is not simply embedded
within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also
contributes to the enactment of this surrounding world” (174).
Drawing on similar claims by Merleau-Ponty, they describe the
organism as both initiating and shaping its environment, with
both systems being “bound together in reciprocal specification
and selection” (174). While an organism’s sensorimotor structure
determines which environmental features are salient in its
perceived world, the actual enactment of such a world is
possible through the distinctive organization of organisms
as living systems.
The Organization of Living Systems
Early enactive work (Varela et al., 1974; Maturana and
Varela, 1987) provided the foundation for understanding the
organization of living beings. On this view, a defining feature of
living beings is that they are continually self-producing—they are
structured such that they are able to maintain themselves as a
unit over time. This feature is referred to as autopoiesis (from
Greek auto-, self, and poiesis, production). Autopoietic systems
are specified as networks of processes with certain enabling
relations. If these relations fail to hold, the system will necessarily
disintegrate (Varela et al., 1974). The canonical example in this
body of work is the cell. A cell can be conceived of as autopoietic
system due to the way in which its internal processes enable the
system to persist:
It is a network of chemical reactions which produce molecules
such that (i) through their interactions generate and participate
recursively in the same network of reactions which produced
them, and (ii) realize the cell as a material entity. Thus the cell as a
physical unity, topographically and operationally separable from
the background, remains as such only insofar as this organization
is continuously realized under permanent turnover of matter,
regardless of its changes in form and specificity of its constitutive
chemical reactions (Varela et al., 1974, 188).
Here, the environment is specified as merely the background
in which the physical unity that is the cell is contrasted. The cell,
as an autopoietic system, is “operationally separable” in that it
undergoes a particular set of reactions that effectively forms an
operationally closed network. Additionally, the cell’s membrane
constitutes a boundary that distinguishes it as an entity from
its environmental setting. In this context, autopoiesis captures
metabolic self-production—it specifies the type of chemical
reactions necessary for a living entity to maintain itself over time.
For Maturana and Varela (1987), metabolic processes are central
to a conceptualization of life, as they constitute the “dynamic
transformations” that enable a living system to persist (Maturana
and Varela, 1987, 46) and, as a result, form a membrane that
serves as a spatial boundary for an individual cell.
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The same organizational pattern can generally be found at
the scale of larger organisms such as animals. Although these
organisms may vary in structural form, they are organized in
the same self-producing manner, in that they are “internally
self-constructive in such a way as to regulate actively their
interactions with their environments” (Thompson and Stapleton,
2009, 24). In other words, organisms are endowed with the ability
to maintain their internal dynamics through self-regulation.
An artifact of this organizational property is that it specifies
an environmental state-space as well, described as the features
that are operationally external to the organism’s self-regulatory
capacities such that they are not necessary for the operational
closure of the organism as a living system, though they may be
necessary for its persisting over time.
Thus, a distinction can be drawn between two co-acting, yet
organizationally distinguishable, systems. This property of the
organism is referred to as its autonomy because it specifies the
organism as a system that is “composed of processes that generate
and sustain that system as a unity” (24). Because the internal, self-
regulatory dynamics of the autonomous system are necessary for
its persisting as a unity, it can be said to be operationally closed
in the same manner that cells are. Importantly, as Thompson
and Stapleton point out, “operational closure does not imply that
conditions not belonging to the system cannot also be necessary”
(24). Living systems are thermodynamically open, such that they
undergo processes to regulate the flow of energy both between
them (from the environment into the system) and within them
(as regulatory processes internal to the system).
The properties of autonomy and operational closure can, in
certain contexts, define a spatial boundary to a system as well. It
is important to note that autonomous systems are not necessarily
autopoietic systems because autonomous systems do not need
to be spatially bound for their self-regulation. Thompson and
Stapleton offer the example of a human or non-human animal
social group as an autonomous system that is not spatially bound
and therefore not autopoietic. As Froese et al. (2007) note:
It is generally claimed that autonomy in living systems is a feature
of self-production or autopoiesis. However, this restriction of
autonomy to living systems is unsatisfactory because we also want
to refer to some systems as autonomous even though they are not
characterized by metabolic self-production, for example artificial
and social systems (Froese et al., 2007, 5; Luisi, 2003).
Further enactive work thus aims at a taxonomy of systems
where autopoietic systems are members of a broader class of
autonomous systems (Froese et al., 2007). Given Maturana and
Varela’s (1987) specification of metabolic processes as those
responsible for the dynamic transformation of components
within the cell as a living system, drawing a distinction between
types of structural arrangements that result in the same type of
network can be helpful, namely, in the case of understanding
social cognition as arising from interactions between two or more
distinct systems.
Specifying an Environment
According to the enactive approach to cognition, living
systems are autonomous systems that are structured by their
own internal, operationally closed regulatory dynamics as
well as their thermodynamically open regulatory dynamics
with the environment. Organisms engage in energy transfer
from environment, but they do not do so entirely passively.
Environmental features have a degree of valence for individual
organisms. For a honeybee, the ultraviolet color pattern found
in the center of a flower indicates a potential pollen location;
for humans, the redness of a tomato indicates it is ready to
be harvested and eaten. Organisms do not engage in passive
reception of sensory stimuli but in positively or negatively
valenced interactions with the environment. On an enactive view,
this process is referred to as sense-making: it is “behavior or
conduct in relation to environmental significance or valence,
which the organism itself enacts or brings forth on the basis
of its autonomy” (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009, 25; see also
Thompson, 2007, Chapter 6; De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
Sense-making, then, is a way of relating to the world and
responding to environmental stimuli for the sake of enabling
further actions and viability.
The enactive notion of structural coupling captures how
organisms relate to their environments. Specifically, coupled
systems, such as the honeybee and the flowering plants in
its ecological niche, structurally codetermine one another as
a result of their reciprocal interactions over time. Varela’s
“Bittorio” model was originally conceived to illustrate how such
structures co-emerge, though Barandiaran (2017) notes some
theoretical difficulties with the model and offers a set of models
illustrating the sensorimotor constitution of neurodynamic
patterns as a more robust example of how autonomous systems
are structurally coupled. On Barandiaran’s account, Bittorio is
problematic as an example of structural coupling due to the fact
that environmental features are both random and held static.
Barandiaran suggests that this is an insufficient characterization
of the environment on an enactive framework. An organism’s
environmental state-space is not merely a random setting but
is constituted by features corresponding to its sensorimotor
capacities, and crucially to the enactive approach, organisms are
not passive receivers of environmental stimuli but are coupled
with the environment in such a way that impacts the structure
of the environment. The conceptualization of the environmental
state-space in the Bittorio model seems to conflict with one of
the key tenets of the enactive approach, namely, that dynamic
interactions with the environment shapes which features will
affect the system; the environment cannot merely be conceived
of as an independent producer of stimuli.
Using Varela’s example of bacteria swimming up a sucrose
gradient (Varela, 1991, 1997), Di Paolo (2005) suggests that
merely describing the system as autopoietic is not enough to
explain the dynamic coupling between the bacteria and the
sucrose environment and the interactions between the two
systems. More is needed that explains “graded notions such as
lacks and breakdowns and articulates in detail how signification
is generated” (Di Paolo, 2005, 437). It is not merely the case
that the bacteria constitute autopoietic systems, while the sucrose
gradient constitutes the environmental state-space. The sucrose
has a degree of valence for the bacteria, as suggested by the
concept of sense-making. It invites further activity as specifically
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an action that is dependent upon on the internal state of the
bacteria at that particular time. Therefore, there is some further
aspect to the coupled system that generates a particular action on
behalf of the bacteria:
As defined, structural coupling is a conservative, not an improving
process; it admits no possible gradation. If the concentration is
enough to keep bacteria viable the latter should be equally –
not more – viable in a range of higher concentrations. Even
if the current rate of nutrient intake is lower than the rate of
consumption (leading to certain loss of autopoiesis in the near
future), bacteria will not seek higher concentrations just because
they are autopoietic since improving the conditions of self-
production is not part of the definition of autopoiesis. Only if they
are able to monitor and regulate their internal processes so that
they can generate the necessary responses anticipating internal
tendencies will they also be able to appreciate graded differences
between otherwise equally viable states (Di Paolo, 2005, 437).
Di Paolo introduces the concept of adaptivity in order to
specify how autopoietic systems maintain homeostasis in the face
of environmental perturbations and despite existing far from
thermodynamic equilibrium. This aspect of autopoietic systems
necessitates that they act in accordance with graded norms of
vitality and viability—bacteria generate appropriate responses
to the presence of a sugar gradient depending upon the state
of their internal processes. This necessitates that environmental
features have a particular valence depending upon the internal
state of the organism and assuming that the organism has some
capacity to engage with the world in such a way that deals with
negatively valenced conditions such as lacks and breakdowns (see
also Weber and Varela, 2002).
Thus, the environment is specified as a source of both
perturbations and assistances according to graded norms, to
which the organism can respond provided it both has the
sensorimotor capacities to do so and those features have a
particular valence that corresponds to an organism’s processes
of internal regulation. The enactive concepts of sense-making
and adaptivity help to flesh out how organisms, as autopoietic
systems, respond to particular features of the environment in the
ways that they do.
While this approach helps to specify the environment as a
state-space populated by elements that correspond to graded
norms relative to particular organisms, there remains the
question of what processes are responsible for the coupling
of these coupled systems. It is clear that the environmental
“information” indicating pollen is in some way coupled with
the honeybee’s capacity for sensing that information. However,
this suggests something of a synchronic view of dynamically
coupled systems—it tells us why an organism may be acting
in a certain manner at a certain time. The environment is
here specified as an organism’s cognitive domain, but the
structure of the environment, itself, is unspecified beyond that
of contingent relations with the sensorimotor capacities of
individual organisms. Cognition is undoubtedly more complex
of a phenomenon than individual instances of perception and
action, and so in order to serve as a rich theory of cognition,
enactivism, I want to suggest, requires a further fleshing out of the
processes relevant to the generation of coupling between systems.
In other words, I hold that it is worth investigating the features of
the structure of organisms as cognizing systems and the system
that makes up their environmental state-space. This task requires
looking at the diachronic relations between organisms and their
dynamic niches, which will be the focus of the Specifying the
Cognitive Domain section.
It is worth noting that early works in the enactive approach,
namely, The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana and Varela, 1987), did,
indeed, give treatment to these biological questions, suggesting
that a history of interactions between systems can result in
structural selection acting upon those systems, which, in turn,
gives way to a particular determination of structure for each
system. This evolutionary-scale claim appears in The Embodied
Mind in the form of “evolutionary path-making,” and is again
addressed in Mind in Life, under the concept of “enactive
evolution.” These arguments are undoubtedly valuable in that
they weave additional biological considerations into an enactive
account of cognition, thus resulting in a naturalized approach
to cognition. However, more recent work in enactivist thinking
has, for the most part, put aside these biological considerations,
despite the fact that recent developments in evolutionary and
developmental biology (Griffiths and Gray, 2001; Stotz, 2014)
have potentially useful resources to contribute to the discussion.
Therefore, drawing attention to this dimension of enactivist
thinking and expanding upon that work can be a fruitful
task to take on.
An enactive view of cognition treats it as a phenomenon
spanning a range of timescales, from those as short as only a
few milliseconds (the domain of neurophysiology) all the way up
to an evolutionary timescale (Varela, 1999; Gallagher, 2017). At
each scale, the emphasis on dynamic coupling between processes
within the larger organism–environment system remains crucial;
the enactive treatment of cells, nervous systems, and organisms
as each constituting an autonomous system both situated in,
and specified by, a particular environmental context illustrates
how the approach is applied at various spaciotemporal scales.
What remains constant is the dual-system organization; the
autonomous system is always specified in the context of
an environmental setting. The environment, therefore, can
refer to any state-space in which an autonomous system
persists. A parasite’s environmental setting is its host; a cell’s
environmental setting is a molecular background. At the scale
of the individual organism, namely, for medium-sized animals
typically under investigation in the study of perception and
cognition, the environmental setting is specified as its ecological
niche. The environment is the appropriate cognitive domain for
an organism, a feature of the enactive approach that ecological
psychology shares.
PERCEIVING ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION
In contrast to commonplace views of perception that describe
it as a process of inferring information from environmental
stimuli, ecological views of perception treat it as a means
of directly picking up information from the environment.
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James Gibson’s work, which serves as a canonical approach
to ecological psychology, emphasized the direct perception of
environmental information. On Gibson’s view, there is no
intermediary task for the brain to accomplish in perceiving
environmental information, and so there is no need to cognitively
represent that information in order to make sense of it. Gibsonian
ecological psychology is thus a non-representational account of
perception, as is the case with the enactive approach.
Affordances as Revealed Information in
the Environment
On Gibson’s approach, percepts are not representations of objects
in the world, but instead are features of the environment itself.
These environment percepts are directly sensed by organisms,
depending upon their sensorimotor capacities. They inform
organisms as to what actions are possible—in other words, what
actions are afforded to the organism. Thus, Gibson termed these
environmental percepts as affordances. Affordances make direct
reference to what is physiologically possible for an organism.
For the honeybee, the pollen-rich flower affords landing on, the
pollen affords collecting, and so on—whatever is afforded to
an organism is something that it perceives and can act upon
accordingly. Affordances can therefore be thought of as action-
guiding cues from the environment (Stoffregen, 2003).
This conceptualization of the environment should sound
relatively similar to that put forth by the enactive approach. There
is a key distinction to be made. However, Gibsonian ecological
psychology suggests that organisms directly perceive information
from the environment, making it the case that such information
is built into the structure of the environment itself. In The
Embodied Mind, Varela et al. (1991) assert that the enactive view
does not share this conceptualization of the environment, in
that they do not hold that perceptual information is “out there”
as a static feature of the environment. Rather, on the enactive
view, perceptual information is constructed via the structural
coupling between organisms and their environments. Thus, there
is an important ontological distinction between the two views.
For Gibson, affordances exist independently from perceivers who
may (or may not) act on them, whereas for enactivists, perceptual
information in the environment is effectively “enacted” via
sensorimotor engagement with the world. Varela et al. (1991)
clarify that “[w]hereas Gibson claims that perception is direct
detection, we claim that it is sensorimotor enactment” (Varela
et al., 1991, 204). While Gibson did state that affordances are
neither objective properties of the environment nor subjective
properties of the perceiver but rather somewhere in between
(Gibson, 1979), his is not a constructivist view, as affordances are
not in essence created in the interaction between perceiver and
environmental stimuli but rather are specified as features acted
upon in a relevant manner.
According to Gibson, it is possible for perceiving organisms
to “pick up” affordances as visual information due to the
way in which the pattern of light reaches a perceiver’s eyes.
A setting is visually accessible when ambient light creates a
particular structure depending on the position of the perceiver.
For example, if you are sitting on a garden bench surrounded
by trees and a garden table, the angles at which the light from
the sun hits these objects will illuminate the setting allowing
you to visually perceive your surroundings. Gibson describes this
particular kind of visual arrangement as the ambient optic array.
The geometric structure of this setting is dependent upon the
position of the perceiver—the angles at which the light hits the
perceiver’s retina will change as the perceiver moves around in
the environmental setting. Through movement, an important
feature of the optic array is revealed—some features change,
such as the particular angles relative to the light source and
the perceiver’s location, but some features are invariant. Thus,
invariant structure is revealed through movement, in addition to
variant structure:
In the optic array, presumably, there is an underlying invariant
structure to specify the edges and corners of the layout and
the colors of the surfaces, and at the same time there is a
changing structure to specify the temporary direction of the
prevailing illumination. Some components of the array never
exchange places – that is, they are never permuted – whereas other
components of the array do. The former specify a solid surface; the
latter specify insubstantial shadows only (Gibson, 1979, 89).
The invariant structure of the garden table, for example,
is revealed through movement relative to the ambient optic
array, and it is this information that can then be acted upon
by the perceiver. The ambient array provides structure to the
environmental setting in such a way that, in turn, provides visual
access to features of that environment.
Naturalizing Perception and the Problem
of Specifying Variables
Gibson’s account of perception appears, at least at first glance,
firmly naturalistic, relying upon optics as the means by which
we establish perceptual contact with the world, rather than
an inferential process dependent upon the construction of a
conceptually imprecise notion of representation. Indeed, as
Withagen and Chemero (2009) note, Gibson’s approach was
an important contribution to the naturalization of perception.
Conceiving of perception as a biological function invited
discussion of how organisms endowed with a perceptual
apparatus made use of the information available to them via
that apparatus as well as how they came to be endowed with
such—in other words, how and why they evolved the capacity
for visual perception. Yet while Gibson’s ecological approach
provided a way of talking about perception in a naturalized
manner, Withagen and Chemero (2009) suggest that further
developments by neo-Gibsonians introduced new problems.
Neo-Gibsonians (Shaw and Kinsella-Shaw, 1988; Turvey,
1990) elaborated on Gibson’s claim that perceptual information
in an environment is specified by the structure of that
environment. Their work details a specificity relation between
the perceptual information and the environmental feature,
and a further specificity relation between the organism’s
perceptual experience and the perceptual information, making
perception “specific to information that is specific to a particular
environmental property” (Withagen and Chemero, 2009, 368).
On the neo-Gibsonian view, then, there is a one-to-one-to-one
mapping between the environment, the perceptual information
in the environment, and the perceptual activity. The environment
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provides the structure for perceptual information to be accessible,
and the perceiver is then able to pick up this information through
their locomotive behavior in the environmental setting.
While Withagen and Chemero (2009) note that the lawlike
generality described by this mapping relation is appealing,
especially for a naturalistic framework, empirical concerns arise.
They stress that “the one-to-one-to-one theory assumes an
absence of variation in what information is exploited both
between animals and within animals over time . . . In other
words, all members of a species use the same information in
their perception of a particular environmental property” (369).
They question whether such a theory is plausible on a naturalistic
approach to perception—that is, on one that treats perception as
a biological phenomenon that is subject to evolutionary pressures
over time. Given evolutionary considerations, they hold that
the one-to-one-to-one theory is implausible: the two specificity
relations fail to hold empirically under biological scrutiny.
The specificity relation between perception and
environmental information suggests that members of the
same species, perceptually endowed in the same manner, make
use of the same environmental information in their perceptual
activity. On this perspective, all honeybees treat UV light as an
action-guiding visual cue, while all humans do not. However,
Withagen and Chemero (2009) note that this claim is inconsistent
with the biological concept of variation. Variation is necessary
for evolution to occur, so in any species subject to evolutionary
change, variation must be present in order for it to then be acted
upon by selection. Suggesting that perceptual information is
specified in an exact manner relative to a perceiving population
leaves no room for variation, thus making the theory biologically
untenable. Individual differences in various traits, including
perceptual abilities, must be possible, making it the case that a
specificity relation between a specific variable as environmental
information and a perceiver is too strict.
Indeed, differences in perceptual abilities only mark one
way in which individual variation may influence relations
between environmental information and perception of that
information. Other psychological and physiological qualities
can have a relevant impact on perception–action dynamics as
well. Salient examples can be found in Dennis Proffitt’s work
on embodied perception: Proffitt (2006) found that distances
to targets appeared greater to participants when they were
tasked with carrying a heavy backpack. Thus, as Proffitt
explains, physiological potential can have a profound impact on
perception. This quality not only varies between individuals but
there can also be significant within-individual variation.
Differences that arise as a result of perceptual learning help
to illustrate the tension in the neo-Gibsonian view. Withagen
and Chemero (2009) cite numerous studies that show how
perceivers can learn to exploit new perceptual information, and
additional research found significant between-subject variation
in perceptual learning ability (Withagen and van Wermeskerken,
2009). They assert that this work shows how human perceivers.
Vary in how well and quickly they can learn a perceptual
task, implying variation in what information is exploited at any
moment in time. Hence, the ubiquitous variation among the
members of a species that proponents of Darwin’s population
thinking emphasize . . . is also present in the perceptual realm.
This means that population thinking needs to be taken seriously in
the study of perception. In other words, the suggested specificity
relation between information and perception and the allied search
for the information that members of a species exploit in a
particular perceptual task are biologically unsound (Withagen and
Chemero, 2009, 374).
A one-to-one mapping between environmental information
as a specific variable and the perception of that information
is therefore problematic on a biological basis. Individuals learn
how to differentiate between variables in the environment,
making it the case that through learning they can act on
information that they previously did not make perceptual contact
with. In addition, individuals vary in their perceptual abilities
(color vision deficiencies are a simple and common example),
so mapping species-typical perceptual abilities onto specific
environmental variables may result in biological inconsistencies.
For a naturalized theory of perception, biological inconsistencies
are severely problematic.
With regard to non-human perceivers, similar results have
been found. The perceptual learning capacities of insects are
commonly studied, namely, in terms of color vision. In many
of these studies, insects are found to possess the ability to
make visual discriminations after undergoing learning tasks,
illustrating the effect of individual experience and learning on
visually guided action. Honeybees, for example, are trichromatic,
with the capacity for visual discrimination in color space.
Avarguès-Weber et al. (2010) found that free-flying honeybees
were able to make more fine-grained color distinctions after
aversion training, showing how individual differences and
learning experiences can change what perceptual information
they interact with. The one-to-one mapping between specified
values in a color space and perceptual activity suggested by
the neo-Gibsonian approach fails to hold in these cases, as
perceptual learning opens up the possibility for interacting with
new perceptual information in a non-species-typical manner.
These individual differences are important on an evolutionary
account in terms of looking at possible mechanisms for, in this
instance, the evolution of color vision as movement through color
space via novel perceptual abilities.
While Gibsonian ecological psychology provides a naturalized
approach to perception that is suitable for understanding
perception as an evolved capacity, I am in agreement with
Withagen and Chemero (2009) that “a naturalistic theory of
perception must explain the individual differences in what
information is exploited in terms of the interplay of multiple
organismal and environmental factors” (379). For this reason,
a neo-Gibsonian reading may prove inadequate, and there is a
task for researchers working in the Gibsonian tradition to address
these biological concerns if the theory is to prevail as a naturalistic
approach. Describing environmental, perceptual information as
specified variables fails to account for individual differences in
perceptual ability, especially due to learning and experience.
Looking beyond the scale of species-typical perceptual ability
and instead considering the individual perceiver’s relation
to its environmental setting requires, in turn, looking at
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individual-specific environmental settings. Often an individual
organism is represented as an idealized member of its species,
and given research constraints, necessarily so. However, such
limitations should not stop researchers from looking more
closely, and more carefully, at what constitutes an individual’s
environmental milieu for the sake of understanding how an
idealized individual might relate to that setting. Indeed, as
stressed in this section, looking at potential ways in which
individual differences may bring about evolutionary change is
necessary for understanding biological diversity, and in thinking
about perception as a biological phenomenon.
In the next section, I suggest a way forward for how to specify
an individual’s cognitive domain for the sake of understanding
how environmental information co-varies with perceptual
abilities. This approach respects the goal of naturalization of
perception as found in Gibsonian ecological psychology, while
at the same clarifying the notion of an “enacted” world central
to the enactive approach to perception and cognition (see also
McGann, 2014 for a complementary approach). In particular, I
suggest that it is helpful to think of an individual organism’s
cognitive domain as mapping onto its developmental niche,
which is the environment in which it undergoes its life cycle.
This specification, I argue, provides a way of thinking about
the environment in organism–environment systems that is
complementary to both enactivism and ecological psychology,
while at the same time addressing some of the ambiguities that
arise in both fields’ use of the environmental setting as a key part
of understanding cognition, action, and perception.
SPECIFYING THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN
I am not using the term “cognitive domain” in any specific
technical sense; it is simply meant to refer to an organism-specific
environmental state-space in which cognitive activity takes place.
We can think of a bee’s cognitive domain, for example, as
the environmental state-space containing whatever is potentially
perceivable and actionable by the bee. Whatever those elements
are will depend upon the bee’s sensorimotor capacities. On an
enactive reading, the bee’s enacted world is its cognitive domain,
in virtue of its autopoietic, adaptive configuration. According to
ecological psychology, the bee’s cognitive domain is populated by
affordances, with certain affordances acted upon according to the
bee’s perceptual activity1.
Determining what elements populate an organism’s cognitive
domain requires careful investigation of its sensorimotor
capacities and its coupled history with its environment (the
details of which matter will be addressed in the Developmental
Niche section). For example, eyes are ubiquitous throughout the
natural world. Yet even in locations where vision is seemingly
1I am aware that there may be a tension here, as affordances are typically
understood as existing independently from a perceiver, and on this account, it
seems as though only organism-specific affordances populate its cognitive domain.
One way to ease this tension might be to suggest that the specification of a
cognitive domain is meant to serve as a heuristic tool. In other words, specifying
an organism’s cognitive domain can be helpful in determining what might be
cognitively relevant to it, but it does not have to entail that the organism is limited
to perceiving only those elements.
no longer worth investing resources in, such as in subterranean
habitats, eye structures, though reduced, persist (Nevo, 1979;
Nikitina et al., 2004). Normal development for the naked mole
rat (Heterocephalus glaber), for example, results in a reduced
eye structure, but an ocular phenotype nevertheless. Researchers
have asked why this trait still develops despite at least 25
million years of subterranean evolutionary pressures (Bennett
and Faulkes, 2000; Nikitina et al., 2004). Just like any organ,
eyes have metabolic costs, and so individuals who direct those
resources elsewhere may be better off. Nikitina et al. (2004)
suggest, however, that a closer inspection of the environmental
stimuli and the mole rats’ regular activities can provide clues as to
why the phenotype has not been completely selected against:
. . . Retaining the capacity for light–dark discrimination is
important for the survival of these animals. The soil-removal
activity of the naked mole rats results in their direct exposure
to sunlight, as the animals kick soil out of an open mound. The
open mound poses a further threat of exposure to aboveground
predators (Sherman et al., 1991). An ability to detect light and dark
and sudden transitions associated with the arrival of a predator
at a well-lit burrow entrance may confer a survival advantage
and hence be maintained by natural selection (Nikitina et al.,
2004, 331).
While the species-typical habitat of the naked mole rat is
categorized as being distinctly subterranean, brief instances
of direct exposure to sunlight is enough to serve as an
environmental pressure necessitating the retaining of an eye
structure. The payoff of these reduced eye structures is a
discounted metabolic cost along with a sufficient capacity for
light–dark discrimination. These findings support an account of
perception that stresses how perception is actually used—while
there are no scientific findings that suggest that the mole rats use
visual information in the way animals with fully developed eyes
typically do, their eyes still pick up environmental information—
specifically, transitions in brightness. They may not be able to
“establish perceptual contact” with objects in the world (including
conspecifics, which they identify through olfactory and tactile
cues) (Nikitina et al., 2004, 331), but in a sense, light still affords
them seeing, albeit an unconventional mode of seeing.
This example is meant to show how careful investigation of the
specifics of the relationship between perceiving organisms and
their environments matters to how we think about perception
and action. The mole rats’ habitat is not merely a subterranean
one, and the particular way they interact with that environment,
even if in brief moments, can end up impacting their evolutionary
trajectory. As we saw, occasional surfacing in the activity of
burrow building has generated enough selective pressure to retain
minimal eye structures. It may not be a conventional way of using
eyes, but it works for the mole rats.
Persisting both at the developmental and at the evolutionary
scale is often a matter of getting by on what works rather
than maximizing potential. Indeed, Varela et al. (1991) note
this biological fact in their reference to evolution as natural
drift, stating a call for recasting selective pressures as “broad
constraints to be satisfied” (Varela et al., 1991, 198). They refer
to this satisficing principle in describing the enactive notion
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of mutual specification, or the Lewontin-inspired notion of
codetermination (Lewontin, 1983):
The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and
specifies its own domain of problems to be solved by satisficing;
this domain does not exist “out there” in an environment
that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop
or parachute into the world. Instead, living beings and their
environments stand in relation to each other through mutual
specification or codetermination. Thus what we describe as
environmental regularities are not external features that have
been internalized, as representationism and adaptationism both
assume. Environmental regularities are the result of a conjoint
history, a congruence that unfolds from a long history of
codetermination. In Lewontin’s words, the organism is both the
subject and the object of evolution (198–199, original italics).
This coupled history matters, particularly in instances
where interacting features are both organisms. Pollinators
and angiosperms are typically thought to have a mutualistic
relationship, with one organism relying upon the other for
its survival and reproductive needs. However, an established
coupled history between these organisms matters for their
viability. Aizen et al. (2014) note that seemingly mutualistic
relationships between a native organism and an invasive
organism may result in detrimental effects to the native organism.
There is a lack of a coupled, shared history between the two
species, resulting in an imbalance in costs and benefits to
each. An established relationship matters for how environmental
features modify organisms over developmental, behavioral, and
evolutionary timescales—features may be exploited (or not) with
a variety of effects over these timescales. In addition, importantly,
organisms, in turn, modify these features, which results in the
generation of new developmental and evolutionary effects, as
discussed in the literature on niche construction (e.g., Odling-
Smee et al., 2003). So the details of interaction matter, especially
for a naturalized account of perception. If we want to understand
perception as a biological phenomenon, we need to look at
how it is actually used, down to the individual differences and
peculiarities such as those seen in the naked mole rat. One
approach to investigating the details of interaction is to consider
the environment at the scale of the individual; this requires
specifying the environment in a more fine-grained manner.
Multiple Senses of Environment
Brandon and Antonovics (1996) suggest that, in the field of
population biology, there are three ways to distinguish between
conceptions of the environment for the sake of understanding
organism–environment coevolutionary dynamics. These
conceptions differ based on what sets of environmental
factors are taken to be relevant in the generation of selective
pressures. The first sense of environment is purely external—the
environment is constituted by a set of factors independent
of an organism of interest and are measured independently
from an organism of interest. Brandon and Antonovics (1996)
suggest that a fundamental problem with conceptualizing the
environment in this manner, however, is that because these
factors are measured entirely independently from the organism,
they may turn out to be irrelevant to an organism’s fitness, and
thus do no work toward an understanding of how and why
populations evolve. So a conception of the environment that
merely identifies the set of physical factors external to organisms
is insufficient.
The second conception of the environment is the ecological
environment, which utilizes organisms as “measuring
instruments” (Brandon and Antonovics, 1996, 164) to determine
the external factors as they affect population growth. This
conception effectively picks out features of the environment that
are relevant to a particular lineage such that identifying them
sheds light on that lineage’s evolutionary trajectory (Griffiths
and Gray, 2001). Brandon and Antonovics (1996) note that a
further step is needed in order to compare fitnesses of different
genotypes. A third conception of the environment as selective
allows for comparison between genotypes in relation to pressures
from the environment. As the goal with this approach is to be
able to measure organism–environment coevolution by way of
assessing organism-relative factors, specifying an environment
as a narrower set of features can aid in understanding why some
genotypes fare better than others. The selective environment,
then, is the appropriate sense of the environment to consider
when comparing individual genotypes, and thus individual
differences that may over time be selected either for or against.
One way to further parse out these differing senses of
environment is in a developmental context, albeit one with
relevant evolutionary implications. Each sense of environment
can be said to be constituted by a set of resources organisms
can make use of, and some of which are necessary for the
transgenerational stability of form (Griffiths and Gray, 1994).
Identifying the structure of resources available to organisms is
a central goal of developmental systems theory (Oyama, 1985).
By specifying individual domains with unique sets of resources,
it is possible to identify developmental resources, which may
arise during the interaction of organisms as developmental
processes and the environments in which they are situated. For
example, persistent resources may be those specified by the
notion of an external environment, such as temperature, gravity,
and light. These resources play a role in the developmental
process and may potentially be relevant to organismal fitness, but
they are not identified with reference to a particular organism
and exist independently and regardless of any organismal
interaction. The sets of resources specified in more fine-grained
scales are all organism-dependent and are thus factors in
the ecological sense of environment. Resources specified at
an even finer-grained scale can arguably fit into the sense
of a selective environment. The availability of these resources
highlights interactions that take into consideration individual
differences in behavior.
Organisms, as developmental processes themselves, make use
of resources across each domain depending on a shared history
of interaction and with regard to individual needs. What is
relevant for the sake of providing an evolutionary explanation
is identifying recurrent interactions between resources and
organisms with the capacity to utilize those resources. Variation
arises when resources are utilized in a new manner, when new
resources are introduced, or existent resources are removed,
the relationship with resources is altered, and so on. In this
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way, the developmental system is comprised of not solely an
individual organism interacting with an environment over the
course of its life cycle, but rather it extends over both the
organism as a developmental process and the developmental
resources with which it is coupled such that interactions
with those resources constitute a species-typical life cycle.
This picture places greater emphasis on the environment,
itself, in understanding the life activity of the organism
than traditional accounts of ontogeny do, as developmental
resources (potential or actual) are integral to the specification
of the system as a developmental system. Without reference
to these features, the resources available for explaining the
transgenerational stability of organismal form are impoverished.
Specifying the environment and building that specification into
an understanding of organisms as developmental processes
embedded within a larger developmental system results in a
richer account of ontogeny, with greater explanatory power
across a developmental timescale, but also a behavioral and, on
a population scale, an evolutionary one.
In ecological psychology, similar attempts have been made
to parse out different senses of the environment. Baggs and
Chemero (2019) distinguish between the physical world, a species
habitat, and an individual organism’s umwelt. Here, I think it is
helpful to map this distinction onto the three-way distinction
between senses of the environment described by Brandon
and Antonovics (1996). The physical world approximately
corresponds to the notion of an external environment—it is not
specified in relation to any particular organism. The sense of
the environment as a habitat is species specific and contains
affordances as resources typical for that species. The third sense of
environment, the umwelt, references Jakob von Uexküll’s concept
of a particular organism’s lived environment (von Uexküll, 2010);
it is a behavior setting that is “shaped by the places where
that individual dwells, and by the history of interactions that
the individual participates in” (Baggs and Chemero, 2019, 16). An
individual organism’s umwelt, then, references its unique abilities
and experiences to determine which features of the world are
especially salient to it given these properties.
The goal in introducing this three-way distinction between the
physical world, a habitat, and an umwelt is to resolve tensions
in Gibson’s original distinction between a perceiver-independent
physical world and an affordance-containing yet ambiguous
surrounding environment, which roughly corresponds to the
notion of a habitat on Baggs and Chemero’s three-way
distinction. What the sense of an umwelt is meant to do, in
this context, is specify exactly how individual differences result
in different affordance spaces. A species-specific habitat contains
environment features that are utilized in a species-typical fashion,
thus referencing an idealized member of that species. The bee
orchid (Ophrys apifera) that successful tricks male bees into
thinking they are encountering female bees presumably tricks all
male bees, but the one male bee that does not fall for this trick
does not act on the affordance in a species-typical manner. The
world, to this clever bee, appears differently—there is no female
bee to encounter, only an equally clever orchid plant. Thus, an
umwelt, as an individual-specific, third sense of environment,
allows for individual variation, which as Withagen and Chemero
(2009) note, is essential for an understanding of evolution on a
naturalized account of perception.
The Developmental Niche
The sense of the environment as an individual-specific
environment, I want to suggest, can be built upon by further
specifying how structural features of the individual-specific
environmental milieu both shape and are shaped by coupled
features of the individual organism. This task requires looking
at the environment, understood as an organism’s cognitive
domain, as an ontogenetic or developmental niche2. Individual
variation in perceptual activity can be investigated in relation
to the developmental niche in which individual organisms
live. I want to suggest that specifying the cognitive domain
in which organisms are situated as their own developmental
niches provides a framework for understanding the environment
in such a way that builds on both enactive and ecological
cognitive science.
West and King (1987) [see also Stotz (2014)] suggest that the
concept of an ontogenetic niche can aid in identifying the set of
developmental resources that an individual inherits in addition to
genes. The social, cultural, and ecological circumstances that an
organism is born into play a prominent role in its developmental
trajectory. For example, West and King (1988) [see also Smith
et al. (2000)] found that the presence and response of female
cowbirds had a significant effect on male song development.
Identifying this social influence as a parameter in the male
cowbird’s ontogenetic niche guides the understanding of what
factors are relevant in the species-typical development of singing
behavior. This influence on song learning and development
can have transgenerational effects, making it the case that the
multimodal (both visual and auditory) sensory feedback from
social interactions can serve as an inherited resource.
Griffiths and Stotz (2018) describe a developmental niche as
the “set of parameters that must be within certain bounds for
an evolved life to occur (or, in more traditional terms, for the
organism to develop normally” (Griffiths and Stotz, 2018, 237).
Importantly, they distinguish between a developmental niche and
the selective niche described by niche construction theory, which
they define as “the set of parameters that determine the relative
fitness of competing types in the population” (ibid.; see also
Stotz, 2017). While the selective niche picks out elements that
generate selective pressure on an organism, the developmental
niche picks out elements that are relevant for the species-typical
development of an organism.
The developmental niche is part of the larger developmental
system; it identifies the environmental setting or context in which
a developmental system constructs a life cycle. It is the set of
parameters that “play a role in the modification and reproduction
of the life cycle” (Stotz, 2017, 2). The relevant parameters may
be not just physical resources but also “social, ecological and
epistemic” (ibid.) resources that aid in the reliable reconstruction
2While West and King use the term “ontogenetic niche,” Griffiths and Stotz
note that they use “developmental niche” as a synonym in their work (Griffiths
and Stotz, 2018; see also Stotz, 2008, 2010; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). I will use
“developmental niche” here to make it clear that I am drawing mainly from DST.
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of a life cycle (in other words, an individual organism3). These
resources are inherited in the reconstructing of a life cycle.
The claim that extragenetic resources are inherited within the
context of a developmental system is a key aspect to DST and
differentiates it from traditional accounts of ontogeny.
One example in this regard is Gottlieb’s (1985, 2002)
experimental work on duckling vocalization behavior (Gottlieb,
1985, 2002; see also Gottlieb, 2001). While this behavioral trait
is typically considered to be instantiated by innate mechanisms,
Gottlieb found that particular external factors, such as a
duckling’s experience hearing its own vocalizations as well
as vocalizations of its siblings while still at the embryotic
stage of development, played a significant role in the species-
typical development of that behavior (Gottlieb, 2002). This
example shows that even something as precise as individual
experience, at a very specific stage in development, can affect
an organism’s developmental and behavioral (and potentially
evolutionary) trajectory:
The intricacy of the developmental causal network revealed
in these experiments proved to be striking. Not only must
the duckling experience the vocalizations as an embryo (the
experience is ineffective after hatching), the embryo must
experience embryonic vocalizations. That is, the embryonic
vocalizations change after hatching and no longer contain the
proper ingredients to tune the embryo to the maternal cell
(Gottlieb, 2002, 170).
In this sense, an individual organism’s developmental niche is
its own unique environmental setting, morphed by its interaction
with resources within the niche just as those resources impact
it. Whether or not species-typical phenotypes are exhibited
is dependent upon specific kinds of interaction between an
organism and the resources within its developmental niche.
Changes in interaction potentially have a generative effect
over time. Shifts in developmental niche are possible through
variation in behavior.
In Oyama’s, The Ontogeny of Information, organisms are
conceived of as integral parts of a larger developmental system,
which contains environmental resources that act on and are
acted upon by the organism in that system. The developmental
system is comprised of a complex web of interactions that
impact how the organism develops and changes over its
lifetime. In this context, an organism’s developmental niche
can be thought of as the specific environmental setting that
is comprised of inherited developmental resources part of a
larger developmental system. Thinking of the environment as an
individual organism’s developmental niche makes it clearer how
organisms form certain relationships with certain environmental
3One route to pursue as an application of this framework is the task of identifying
what qualifies as an organism in organism–environment systems. I do not have the
space to give this task adequate treatment here, but I do think there are resources
available for addressing it. For example, we might think of the organism in the
organism–environment (or developmental) system as the process of an individual
life cycle (see Griffiths and Gray, 1994, 2001; Griffiths and Stotz, 2018). Recent
discussions on process ontology in biology (see Nicholson and Dupré, 2018) are
also resourceful. A process view of the organism would fit fairly naturally with the
enactive approach, I think, though I am less sure of how well it would connect with
ecological psychology. I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing attention to
this important question.
elements (including conspecifics) and how those relationships
can change (and new ones created) over developmental,
behavioral, and evolutionary time. This conceptualization leaves
room for the creation of new coupling processes via individual
innovation, potentially leading to new features of both the
organism and its environment.
As Gottlieb stresses, developmental systems are dynamic and
in constant flux, with new iterations (i.e., new generations)
impacted by prior individual variations acted upon by
selection over time. This view of the environment thus avoids
potential issues with circularity that may arise if the improper
environmental scale is considered. The concern here is that on
a generalized account of the environment, which as stressed in
the previous section leaves no room for variation, a perceiver–
environment system is markedly circular—perceivers pick up
relevant environmental stimuli, and environmental stimuli is
present as a resource for perceivers. This picture does not tell
us why the coupling has arisen or why it persists. Bees perceive
UV light, and UV light is perceivable by bees. However, this was
not always the case; bees did not pop into existence ready to
utilize UV light as an action-guiding visual cue. In a similar vein,
one hypothesis for the evolution of trichromatic color vision in
some primates was the ability to pick out colored fruit (Allen,
1879). A generalization of this coupling does not tell us how
organisms move, evolutionarily, through color space. It properly
identifies a coupled system, but provides only a synchronic
account of that phenomenon. If we are convinced that a dynamic
approach to understanding perceptual activity is a fruitful way
forward, we must look at the environmental setting in which
perception occurs across multiple timescales—developmentally,
behaviorally, and evolutionarily. I have attempted to illustrate
that the biological resources for looking at the individual
organism across these scales (both spatial and temporal) are
plentiful, and thus, a robust naturalized account of perception
ought to make good use of them.
In accordance with DST’s concept of a developmental
niche and Baggs and Chemero’s sense of the environment
as an individual-specific umwelt, I suggest that one fruitful
way of specifying the cognitive domain is to characterize it
as an individual-specific developmental niche. On this view,
conceptual tools from enactivism and ecological psychology can
be put to use alongside conceptual tools from DST to result in a
cohesive framework for understanding the cognitive domain for
perceiving organisms.
Enactivists speak of the “enacted world” of a perceiver
as emerging from perceptual interactions contingent upon
sensorimotor capacities. The enacted world is populated by
environmental features with potential valence to an organism
depending on the internal needs of the organism at a specific
time (Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2017). The enactive
approach is thus a naturalistic one, as it draws on the biological
factors involved in cognition for explanatory purposes. However,
exactly what features populate an organism’s enacted world
is dependent upon not only a history of coupled interactions
between its species and the ecological environment but also
between an individual and its developmental niche. Importantly,
these interactions are dynamic, with some couplings strongly
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conserved over time (such as eye structures and light stress)
(Nilsson, 2009; Oakley and Speiser, 2015) and others in flux
during an individual’s life cycle (such as differentiation in abilities
enabled by learning). Thus, the cognitive domain of a perceiving
organism shapes and is shaped by that organism’s influences on
various timescales, making the enacted world a dynamic one
emerging out of a complex web of interactions as a result of
both individual experience and innovation4 as well as species-
typical behavior.
From ecological psychology, resources across each
environmental domain, from persistent resources to self-
generated resources (Griffiths and Gray, 1994), can be thought
of as affordances in that they invite certain interactions that
have the potential to alter both the developmental trajectory
of an organism and its species’ evolutionary trajectory. In this
way, affordances are conceived of as non-specifying features,
in that they vary as a result of cycles of interactions within the
developmental system. The problem neo-Gibsonians face due
to their commitment to the specification of features, then, is
avoided. This leaves room for the evolution of affordances as
resources themselves, as well, as repeated interactions with a
resource may result in evolutionary change within that resource,
as is seen in relationships of coevolution between two species.
Variations in interactions, therefore, lends to the possibility
of new resources being utilized in the reconstruction of the
developmental process, resulting in changes to organismal form
over time—in other words, to evolutionary change. Enough
repeated iterations of an interaction between a developmental
resource and the organism as a developmental process can
result in the emergence of new features to make better use
of that resource.
Conceiving of the organism-specific environment as a
developmental niche can potentially aid in alleviating some
ontological tensions between enactivism and ecological
psychology. On an enactive reading, the niche is partially
constructed by the organism that occupies it and is continuously
shaped by the organism’s behavior. According to ecological
psychology, the niche is populated by affordances, which exist as
physical features of the environment but afford certain actions
in relation to the organism’s capacities. Affordance spaces might
be constructed by individuals in a literal sense, but they are still
features of the environment that can, in turn, have an effect on
other systems that occupy that space. For example, a beaver
dam is constructed by individual beavers, yet the structure
itself can change the flow of the river, can provide a living
place for other organisms, and so on. The constructing of an
affordance space does not merely change the actions afforded
to individual beavers, but has a global ecological effect as well.
Therefore, thinking of an affordance space as relational only to
the perceivers that are foremost responsible for its construction
4One example of (often individual) innovation having a downstream effect is the
notion of “cumulative culture,” or the “ever-increasing, additive complexity or
efficiency of cultural performance over time” (Schofield et al., 2018). The sweet
potato washing behavioral repertoire of Japanese macaques began with a single
innovator, with the behavior quickly spreading to others in the group. It is noted
that the washing has the effect of reducing parasitic infections, thus suggesting an
adaptive aspect to the behavior as well.
might result in overlooking some important ecological aspects of
that affordance space as an ecological niche.
Importantly, the developmental niche need not be thought
of as being populated solely by biological or ecological factors5.
Social and cultural affordances play a large role in guiding action
for humans (Rietveld et al., 2013) and arguably for non-human
animals as well (Avital and Jablonka, 2000). The resources an
organism inherits in a niche include both physical resources such
as food and shelter but also the potential for social interaction
with conspecifics and behavioral traditions such as those seen in
West and King’s cowbirds. Individuals inherit a species-typical
affordance space, but continue to shape it over time via their own
behaviors and in regard to their own interests. Although beyond
the scope of this paper, the close investigation of the social and
cultural affordances in an individual’s developmental niche may
reveal valuable insights about individual variation and change.
By specifying the cognitive domain as an individual’s
developmental niche comprised of developmental resources,
and as an integral part of the larger developmental system, it
is possible to gain a better understanding of why perceiving
organisms perceive the sort of features that they do, and how they
are able to act on perceptual information in the way that they do.
Importantly, this account provides us with a way of looking at
how novelty, such as the move from dichromacy to trichromacy,
may have been generated as a result of complex interactions
between organisms and features within their environment.
However, it also suggests the need for a complementary
psychological view that emphasizes the dynamic relationship
between organisms and their environments, across multiple
spatial and temporal scales, and it is here that I think enactivism
and ecological psychology equally have resources to contribute.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In their 2019 paper, “Von Uexküll Revisited: Addressing
Human Biases in the Study of Animal Perception,” Caves
et al., 2019 suggest that human perceptual biases have skewed
experimental methodologies in sensory ecology, resulting in
inaccurate portrayals of the visual world of differing species.
A way forward for sensory ecology, they suggest, is to consider
the specific context relevant to the perceptual phenomenon
under investigation—that is, to look at which features of the
visual environment are salient to an individual of that species,
their physiological makeup, their behavioral traits, and so on.
An account of perception that looks more carefully at the
relationship between organisms and their environments can aid
in avoiding such a bias, as it would involve taking seriously
how the organism’s body plays a role in its perceptual activity,
how certain environmental features are perceptually salient
depending on sensorimotor capacities, how organisms directly
pick up information in the environment without the need
for neurological machinery to translate that information from
internal representations, and so on. Such an account would not
5Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the relevance of social
affordances in this context.
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take for granted how perception is utilized in the natural world.
Both enactivism and ecological psychology have the conceptual
tools to contribute to this view of perception; both stress the
active exploration of the environment as central to understanding
perception. However, we must look more carefully at that active
exploration, over developmental, behavioral, and evolutionary
time, and in turn, we must look at precisely what is being explored
in order to understand perception as a biological phenomenon.
In this paper, I have argued that specifying the cognitive
domain as an individual-specific developmental niche serves as
a way to define the sort of environment that is referred to in
the concept of organism–environment systems. This concept of
the environment picks out the unique and dynamic relationships
between perceiving organisms and their environments that might
otherwise go unnoticed on either a physical environment reading
or potentially even an ecological environment reading, which
focuses on idealized members of a species. Sharpening the
explanatory picture in this way allows us to account for individual
variation, in line with concerns raised in Withagen and Chemero
(2009), and provides a better sense of what generates novel
traits by looking at why an individual might either respond
differently to existing environmental stimuli or cope with
new environmental perturbations by generating novel adaptive
responses. As shown in the previous section, these insights can
shed light on broader questions about perception, and in such
a way that shows the advantages to an account of perception
that investigates the organism as a whole in the context of its
surroundings. Both enactivism and ecological psychology share
that commitment, and thus, the hope is to bolster both theories
simultaneously by appealing to such a framework.
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